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chconline.org (C. Klaiman), schultzrt@email.chop.eduAlthough it has been suggested that individuals with an Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) process faces
less holistically than typically developing controls, there are few direct investigations of this hypothesis.
This question was addressed before using the composite paradigm (Teunisse, J. P., & de Gelder, B. (2003).
Face processing in adolescents with autistic disorder: The inversion and composite effects. Brain Cogni-
tion, 52(3), 285–294.). The results had revealed that adolescents with ASDs were less sensitive than con-
trols to the misalignment of face parts and it was concluded their face processing was less holistic.
However, because of shortcomings of the design, it was not possible to distinguish whether individuals
with Autism processed both aligned and misaligned composites in a part-based fashion, or both in a
holistic fashion. We compared adolescents with ASDs to controls matched on sex, age and IQ on a more
complete version of the composite paradigm. The results indicate that individuals with ASDs, like con-
trols, experience interference from facial features that they are told to ignore. However, while such inter-
ference is released for controls if parts of face composites are misaligned, individuals with ASDs show
comparable interference from irrelevant parts regardless of alignment. Two different interpretations
are discussed, both compatible with the idea that perceptual and or attentional abnormalities in ASDs
result in a diminished level of expertise for faces.
 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Individuals with Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) suffer from
multifaceted impairments including deﬁcits in language and com-
munication skills, repetitive behaviors and restricted interests and
difﬁculties with social interactions. Both fMRI and ERP studies sug-
gest abnormal processing of faces in the brain of people with ASDs
relative to typically developing controls (Grice et al., 2001; Pierce,
Muller, Ambrose, Allen, & Courshenes, 2001; Schultz et al., 2000;
Webb & Aggarwal, 1981). Behavioral evidence also suggests that
faces are processed by individuals with ASDs using an abnormal
strategy (Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; Langdell,
1978; Rutherford, Clements, & Sekuler, 2007). Yet studies on this
issue paint a somewhat confusing picture from which it is difﬁcult
to extract the exact nature of the behavioral deﬁcit.
One proposal has been that individuals with ASDs process faces
in a more part-based fashion than typically developing controls.
The idea that faces are perceived more holistically than other ob-
jects is a theme that pervades the literature on typical adult facell rights reserved.
(I. Gauthier), cklaiman@
(R.T. Schultz).processing (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tana-
ka, 1998; Tanaka & Farah, 1993). There are several deﬁnitions of
holistic processing in the literature but they commonly refer to
the facilitatory effect that the context of a whole upright face has
on judgments about its parts and their relations (Farah et al.,
1998). Holistic processing was not directly measured in ASD until
a study by Joseph and Tanaka (2003). Using a task called the
whole-part paradigm (Tanaka & Farah, 1993), these authors re-
ported that children with ASDs processed faces holistically only
when recognition depended on the mouth. That is, controls always
recognized face parts better in the context of the whole faces in
which the parts had been studied (a whole-part advantage) and
also recognized whole faces better upright than inverted (an inver-
sion effect). In contrast, children with Autism showed both whole-
part and inversion effects when recognition depended on the
mouth, whereas these effects were not obtained when recognition
depended on the eyes, in which case their performance was very
poor. These ﬁndings are generally consistent with prior studies
that found a reduced, non-existent, or even reversed face inversion
effect (Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Langdell, 1978; Tantam,
Monaghan, Nicholson, & Stirling, 1989) as well as abnormally high
attention to the mouth area relative to the eyes in individuals with
ASDs (Klin et al., 2002). A recent study measuring the ability to
Fig. 1. Deﬁnition of congruency in a composite matching task. Trials were the top
are relevant are illustrated as an example (bracket on test face illustrate a cue
indicating the top is relevant). Congruent trials are those where the test and study
faces match in both parts, or differ in both parts. Incongruent trials are those where
the relevant part of the test face is the same as in the study face, but the irrelevant
parts do not match, or the relevant part of the test face differs from the study face,
but the irrelevant parts are identical.
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a subgroup of young adults with ASDs (those with lower verbal IQ)
showed poor performance with eyes, no deﬁcit or advantage was
observed in ASD in the detection of mouth changes (Rutherford
et al., 2007). Another study argued for a non-speciﬁc conﬁgural
deﬁcit in ASD and reported a correlation between performance
on conﬁgural tasks with non-face objects and performance on face
tasks (Behrmann et al., 2006). However, that study did not assess
conﬁgural or holistic processing with faces.
At the same time, other studies have failed to replicate some of
these effects. One study suggested that once ﬂoor effects are con-
trolled for, a normal face inversion effect is obtained in individuals
with ASDs (Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003, see also Lahaie et al., 2006).
Another study (Lopez, Donnelly, Hadwin, & Leekam, 2004) mea-
sured the whole-part advantage under two different conditions:
without cueing the participants as to the part relevant for recogni-
tion (as was done originally by Joseph & Tanaka, 2003) or cueing
them to attend to the relevant part. While cueing had little effect
on controls, it affected the performance of adolescents with ASDs:
uncued trials led to abnormal performance (no whole advantage)
while cued trials led to a normal whole-part advantage. Besides
suggesting a role for attentional mechanisms in face processing
deﬁcits in ASDs, Lopez and colleagues also failed to replicate Joseph
and Tanaka’s ﬁnding that mouth processing is normal in ASD when
parts are not cued. Whether participants need to distribute their
attention to all face parts to solve a given task may be an important
factor in interpreting the results of other studies, but that factor
alone may not explain all the results.
One problem concerning the partly discrepant results of Joseph
and Tanaka (2003) and Lopez et al. (2004) resides in the use of the
whole-part paradigm. First, it has been suggested that this task
does not measure an effect unique to face perception, despite what
was originally reported by Tanaka and Farah (1993). For instance, a
whole-part advantage for non-face objects has been observed
(Gauthier & Tarr,1997, 2002; Tanaka et al., 1996). Second, in exper-
tise training paradigms where other hallmarks of conﬁgural and
holistic processing can be obtained for non-face objects following
extensive practice at individuating objects, the whole-part advan-
tage is comparable in novice and expert participants even when
other measures of holistic processing increase with perceptual
expertise (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Gauthier,
Williams, Tarr, & Tanaka, 1998). Moreover, Leder and Carbon
(2005) have shown that the whole-part advantage depends on par-
ticipants initially studying whole faces: when parts are studied in-
stead, part recognition is superior to whole recognition, consistent
with the general predictions of the encoding speciﬁcity principle
(Tulving & Thomson, 1973). As a whole, this suggests that the
whole-part advantage may be at best a problematic index of holis-
tic processing and may greatly depend on domain-general princi-
ples of memory.
In contrast, the composite paradigm is a different task that of-
fers a better measure of the holistic processing strategy that is spe-
ciﬁc to faces (Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). In the matching
version of the composite paradigm, face halves are combined to
create new composite faces, and participants are asked to selec-
tively attend to only the top or bottom half of a study face, which
they are asked to match to the equivalent part in a test composite.
Speciﬁcally, in the design used in this work, congruent trials refer to
trials where the relevant (attended) and irrelevant parts are both
the same, or both different, between study and test. In contrast,
on incongruent trials, the relationship between the study and test
irrelevant is opposite to the relationship for the relevant part. For
instance, if the relevant parts are identical, then the irrelevant
parts are different from each other (see Fig. 1). In this task, holistic
processing is characterized as a failure of selective attention mea-
sured by a congruency effect: performance that is better on congru-ent than incongruent trials reveals that participants have difﬁculty
ignoring the irrelevant part (Cheung, Richler, Palmeri, & Gauthier,
2008; Farah et al., 1998; Richler, Gauthier, Wenger, & Palmeri,
2008, Richler, Tanaka, & Brown, Gauthier, 2008). Typically develop-
ing adults process upright faces holistically according to this mea-
sure (Boutet, Gentes-Hawn, & Chaudhuri, 2002; Cheung et al.,
2008; Gauthier, Curran, Curby, & Collins, 2003; Goffaux & Rossion,
2006; Hole, 1994; Richler, Gauthier et al., 2008; Richler, Tanka et al.,
2008; Young et al., 1987). Holistic processing is reduced when the
two parts of the faces are inverted (Hole, 1994) or misaligned (Che-
ung et al., 2008; Richler et al., in press; Young et al., 1987). This align-
ment effect suggests that when the meaningful conﬁguration of the
face isdisrupted, so isholisticprocessing (seealsoGoffaux&Rossion,
2006;Hole, 1994;Hole,George,&Dunsmore, 1999; LeGrand,Mond-
loch,Maurer, & Brent, 2004;Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara,
2006; Robbins & McKone, 2007; Young et al., 1987). Note that the
alignment effect is a relatively crude measure of the sensitivity of
the perception of upright faces to conﬁgural information. In other
tasks, conﬁgural processing translates into exquisite sensitivity to
much smaller disruptions of the metric relations between parts
(e.g., Le Grand et al., 2004; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997).
In summary, the composite paradigmallows themeasurement of
failures of selective attention to parts that result from a holistic pro-
cessing strategy, and the speciﬁcity of this holistic strategy to the
normal face conﬁguration. In a typical adult population, both phe-
nomena (holistic processing and its speciﬁcity to the normal face
conﬁguration) are more important for faces than for other objects
(Farah et al., 1998; Gauthier et al., 2003; Richler, Bukach, &Gauthier,
in press) and both increase with expertise (Gauthier et al., 2003). In
addition, holistic processing asmeasured in this task correlateswith
activity in the FFA (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002), an area that is hypoactive
during face perception in ASD (Schultz et al., 2000).
Only one study to date has tested individuals with ASDs using a
composite task (Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003). Adolescents with a
clinical diagnostic of Autism (mean age 19.5) were compared to
typically developing children (age 9 and 10) and to typical under-
graduate controls. In addition to differing in chronological age, the
groups were not compared on IQ, although only high-functioning
individuals with Autism were included. Participants were pre-
sented with a three quarter front view target composite face for
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groups), and after a 3 s delay, two probes were shown. Both probes
used an identical (and novel) bottom half, but only one probe had
the same top half as the studied face. Participants made speeded
matching judgments on the top half. In different blocks, the probes
were shown upright/aligned, upright/misaligned, inverted/aligned
and inverted/misaligned. The undergraduate controls showed the
expected pattern of results: better performance for misaligned
than aligned trials, but only in the upright orientation. In contrast,
the Autism group showed no effect of alignment on either upright
or inverted trials. However, typical children also failed to show the
expected adult pattern.
On the basis of these results, Teunisse and de Gelder concluded
that adolescents with Autism are less susceptible to contextual
information in a task where facial features need to be matched.
Several aspects of this study limit its interpretation and the current
study was designed to address them. First, there was no control
group matched in either chronological age or IQ to the participants
with Autism. Second, the study only assessed judgments for the
top half of faces, so it is not possible to assess differences between
mouths and eyes. Third, the inspection time for the adolescents
with Autism was three times longer than for the adult group, mak-
ing any comparison difﬁcult. Fourth, no direct group comparison
was performed, to ascertain whether the individuals with Autism
really performed differently from the two control groups. Fifth,
Autism diagnoses were not conﬁrmed with gold standard research
procedures, such as the Autism diagnostic interview (ADI, Lord,
Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994) or the Autism Diagnostic Observation
schedule (Lord et al., 1999). Sixth, the irrelevant part in both probe
faces was always different from that in the target face. Although
this is similar to the original design used by Young et al. (1987),
other recent studies have introduced a new version of the compos-
ite task (Boutet et al., 2002; Farah et al., 1998; Gauthier et al., 2003;
Richler et al., in press). This variant has been called the ‘‘complete
composite paradigm” because it includes the conditions where the
irrelevant parts of the study and test faces are identical, in addition
to the standard conditions where these irrelevant parts differ from
each other (Cheung et al., 2008; Gauthier and Bukach (2007), Rich-
ler et al., in press). It has been argued that analysis of sensitivity in
the complete composite design can measure holistic effects with-
out a confounding contribution of the considerable response biases
that are often observed in this task (Cheung et al., 2008; Richler
et al., in press; Wenger & Ingvalson, 2002).
To address all of these limitations and revisit the question of
whether people with ASD process faces less holistically, we used
the complete composite paradigm in adolescents with ASDs and
age- and IQ-matched controls.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Twenty-four adolescent males with an ASD participated in the
experiment as well as 17 typically developing adolescent male con-
trols. Five of the participants (three in the ASD group, two in the
control group) were later excluded on the basis of chance perfor-
mance in the experiment. The resulting two groups did not differ
in chronological age (ASD: mean 12.84, SD 3.92; controls: mean
12.01, SD 1.97; t3 = 0.84, p = 0.41), or in full-scale IQ (ASD: mean
93.14, SD 20.0; Controls: mean 101.6, SD 15.1; t34 = 1.48,
p = 0.16). Healthy controls were recruited from the local commu-
nity and were screened for a history of current or lifetime psychiat-
ric and neurological disorder using in house parent report
questionnaires. None of the control participants had ever been diag-
nosed or suspected of having a DSM IV Axis 1 disorder. None had a
ﬁrst or second degree relative with an ASD, each reported good peerrelationships, and none displayed any signs of social disability dur-
ing informal interviews by licensed clinical psychologists experi-
enced in the diagnosis of pervasive developmental disorders.
Individuals with an ASD were diagnosed using standardized re-
search diagnostic procedures involving (1) careful interviewing of
a primary care taker on early development using the Autism diag-
nostic interview (ADI; Lord et al., 1994); (2) a careful clinical inter-
view of the patient using the Autism diagnostic observation
schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 1999); and (3) a consensus clinical
diagnostic process among two or more experienced clinicians,
weighing all of the available evidence. These are the gold standard
diagnostic procedures endorsed by the NIH collaborative programs
for excellence in Autism (CPEA) network. Of the 21 individuals
with an ASD who successfully completed the paradigm, 11 were
diagnosed with autistic disorder, seven with asperger syndrome
and three with pervasive developmental disorder, not otherwise
speciﬁed. The mean on the ADOS social algorithm for the individ-
uals with Autism was 11.1 (SD = 2.38), for asperger’s syndrome
was 6.67 (SD = 3.08) and for PDD-NOS was 5.33 (SD = 4.04). The
ADI social totals for each group, respectively, were 22.11
(SD = 6.29), 18.6 (SD = 7.06) and 16.67 (7.02).
All participants were assessed with a battery of clinical and
neuropsychological measures as part of a larger project, and pro-
vided informed consent. The IQ scores were obtained with the
Wechsler intelligence scales (WISC III, Wechsler, 1992) or WAIS
III (Wechsler, 1997). None of the ASD participants had a known ge-
netic disorder such as fragile X disorder. All were in good health
and had normal or corrected 20–20 vision. The face perception
tasks were completed in a single session; other testing was com-
pleted on a different day.
2.2. Procedure and materials
The stimuli were created from twelve digital images of male
faces without hair, beard or other salient diagnostic features (from
the face database provided by the Max-Planck Institute for Biolog-
ical Cybernetics in Tuebingen, Germany). Each face was approxi-
mately 200  160 pixels in size and transformed to grayscale.
The top and bottom halves of each face were saved as separate
images and reorganized to create 24 composites. Parts were paired
systematically so that each top or bottom appeared in two com-
posites. A misaligned version was created for each composite by
moving the bottom part towards the right approximately 70 pixels
(so that the edge of the bottom half fell on the centre of the top
half). A 3 pixel thick black line was positioned at the seam between
the two halves of each stimulus (or in the same position for iso-
lated parts). This is done to make it completely clear where the
top half starts and the bottom half ends, if anything facilitating
selective attention to the cued parts. Thus, any holistic processing
we measure cannot be attributed to participants being unclear
about the regions of the face to which they were supposed to at-
tend. A 256  256 pixel nonsense texture mask was also created.
The experiment was conducted on Mac OS9 computers using
RSVP software (Williams & Tarr, no date). Participants were tested
in a quiet room, free from distractions, on a MacIntosh laptop with
a 15” monitor. Participants were positioned at a comfortable view-
ing distance, not strictly controlled but approximately 100 cm from
the screen. After administering the instructions and guiding the
participants through the practice trials, the experimenter remained
in the testing room to monitor performance, encourage on-task
compliance and to handle any other issues that might arise. There
were 240 experimental trials and their order was randomized for
each participant, with the constraint that they were blocked by
cued part: four blocks of 30 trials each for the top or bottom cued
conditions were alternated, with the order counterbalanced across
subjects. Each block began with a prompt ‘‘Are the TOPS the same?
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top).” The isolated trials (48) showed each of the 24 isolated parts
twice, once on a same trial, once on a different trial. Note that iso-
lated parts were shown on the screen in their natural position in
the original face, rather than centered on the screen. The remaining
trials (192) consisted of a combination of 12 stimuli  2 cued parts
(top, bottom)  2 conﬁgurations (aligned, misaligned)  2 levels of
congruency (congruent, incongruent)  2 correct response (same,
different). Eight practice trials, randomly selected for each partici-
pant among all conditions, were not analyzed.
Each trial began with the message ‘press the space bar’, fol-
lowed by a study face which was shown for 700 ms, a ﬂashing
mask (four identical masks shown each for 120 ms, alternating
with 50 ms blanks for a total of 630 ms), a rectangular bracket cue-
ing top or bottom judgments, shown for 800 ms, which remained
on the screen when the test face appeared (Fig. 2). The cue ap-
peared before the test face and remained present thereafter to en-
sure that participants were very clear on which part to attend and
which to ignore: any holistic processing we measure is unlikely to
be due to participants forgetting which part was relevant on any
trial. In addition, trials were blocked by cued part, so that partici-
pants did not have to switch their attention constantly. Partici-
pants indicated by button press whether the cued part was the
same at study and test. The test stimulus stayed on the screen until
the participant responded using the ‘1’ = same and ‘2’ = different
keys on the numerical keypad, or for 5000 ms. Participants were
instructed to respond as rapidly as possible once they had made
up their mind. Reaction times were measured from the appearance
of the test stimulus and trials timed out after 5000 ms. A 500 ms
break followed each response, before the start of the next trial.
No feedback was given regarding performance. For consistency
with previously published composite paradigms, ﬁxation was not
controlled. Participants were given frequent breaks. Following each
break, participants were reminded again of the instructions and
told which of the top or bottom they were then going to respond
to for the following block of trials.
3. Results
3.1. Whole face conditions
First, to assess holistic and conﬁgural processing we analyzed
discriminability (d-prime) results (shown in Fig. 3) in the wholeFig. 2. Examples of trials used in the experiment. Faces were always shown in the same f
was cued on each trial (the isolated example shows a bottom cue, the other examples sh
either congruent or incongruent with the correct response for the cued part (the aligne
trial).face conditions (aligned and misaligned trials) in a 2 (part)  2
(alignment)  2 (congruency)  2 (group) mixed-design ANOVA
with group as the only between-subjects factor. Remember that
holistic processing is deﬁned as a congruency effect (better perfor-
mance on congruent vs. incongruent trials; see Fig. 1). Sensitivity
to conﬁguration in this task is measured by the alignment effect:
the typical pattern in this paradigm is for congruency effects to
be reduced as the face parts are misaligned, producing an interac-
tion between congruency and alignment. Our analyzes revealed
main effects of group, F(1,34) = 12.26, p = .001, cued part F(1,34) =
20.96, p < .0001 and Congruency F(1,34) = 26.76, p < .0001. That is,
controls performed better than individuals with ASDs, top judg-
ments were better than bottom judgments and performance was
better on congruent than incongruent trials. As expected, there
was also an interaction between congruency and alignment,
F(1,34) = 11.30, p = .002.
Of particular interest for our hypothesis, we found a signiﬁcant
three-way interaction between group, congruency and alignment,
F(1,34) = 3.64, p = .04, illustrated in Fig. 4. This interaction was fur-
ther explored in separate ANOVAs for each group. The control
group showed the expected interaction between congruency and
conﬁguration, F(1,14) = 16.82, p = .001, with a larger congruency
effect for aligned than misaligned trials. In contrast, and despite
the added power of a larger group, this interaction was not signif-
icant in the Autism group (F < 1), who only showed a main effect of
congruency F(1,20) = 16.67, p = .0006).
In sum, controls processed faces holistically, with the typical
congruency effect with aligned faces, and they were also sensitive
to conﬁguration, as revealed by a reduction of the congruency ef-
fect when parts were misaligned. While individuals with ASDs
also showed a congruency effect, it was observed equally for
aligned and misaligned faces. Thus, the ASD group showed no
sensitivity to conﬁguration. As can been appreciated in Fig. 3,
the congruency effect was relatively reduced for the ASD group
matching the tops of faces. This was suggested by a trend for
an interaction between group, part and congruency,
F(1,34) = 2.93, p = .10. This effect was further investigated with
an ANOVA limited to the aligned trials, which carry the congru-
ency effect in control participants. However, the 3-way interac-
tion still did not reach signiﬁcance, F(1,34) = 2.93, p = .12, and
therefore the best summary of the group differences we observe
in sensitivity remains the group  congruency  alignment inter-
action illustrated in Fig. 4.ormat (isolated, aligned or misaligned) at study and test. The top or the bottom part
ow top cues). In the aligned and misaligned conditions, the irrelevant part could be
d example shows an incongruent trial, the misaligned example shows a congruent
Fig. 3. Mean sensitivity (top) and median response times for correct responses (bottom) in the different conditions as a function of group, part, conﬁguration and congruency.
B denotes baseline trials in the isolated part condition, which are neither congruent nor incongruent. Error bars show the standard error of the mean in each condition.
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tions. In particular, there is a potential ﬂoor effect in two condi-
tions where the ASD group’s performance was not signiﬁcantly
different from 0, for incongruent bottom trials with both aligned
and misaligned conﬁgurations (see Table 1). While this ﬂoor effect
makes it difﬁcult to describe the exact pattern of performance for
bottom trials in the ASD group, even if these incongruent trials
were not at ﬂoor and performance could get worse in these two
cells of the design, we would still be left with an abnormal pattern
of performance because of the signiﬁcant congruency effect in the
misaligned condition. In other words, we must be cautious in inter-
preting the absence of a difference in magnitude of the congruency
effect between the two conﬁgurations, but the presence of a con-
gruency effect in the misaligned condition is robust and qualita-
tively different from the control pattern. To further test whether
the group difference could be attributed to the overall poor perfor-
mance in the ASD group, we performed two additional analyses on
the ASD data alone. First, we calculated the correlation between
overall performance in the whole face conditions and the magni-
tude of the congruency effect in the critical misaligned condition.
Contrary to the idea that participants in the ASD group who per-
form the best are the most likely to perform like controls, the cor-relation was non-signiﬁcant and even in the opposite direction
(r = .32, p = .16). Second, we calculated the correlation between
overall performance in the whole face conditions and the differ-
ence in the congruency effect between the aligned and misaligned
condition (i.e. the magnitude of the interaction between congru-
ency and alignment). The concern was that the higher the overall
performance, the larger this difference would be. There was, how-
ever, no clear relationship between the interaction and perfor-
mance (r = .08, p = .73). In sum, there is no evidence that the
absence of an interaction between congruency and alignment ob-
tained in the ASD group is attributable to poor performance.
However, because of the high error rate, the pattern of correct
response times may be unreliable and we report it here only for
the sake of completeness. We submitted median response times
for correct responses (shown in Fig. 3) to the same omnibus
2  2  2  2 ANOVA as we had done for d-prime. Responses faster
than 200 ms or slower than 4000 ms were excluded, removing only
2% of the trials. There were signiﬁcant main effects of Part,
F(1,34) = 4.32, p = .05 and Congruency, F(1,34) = 5.56, p = .02. Par-
ticipants were faster for top cued trials and for congruent trials.
There was a signiﬁcant interaction between congruency and align-
ment, F(1,34) = 6.03, p = .02. Post-hoc tests (Scheffé’s, alpha = .05)
Fig. 4. Illustration of the signiﬁcant 3-way interaction between group, alignment
and congruency in sensitivity. Error bars show the standard error of the mean in
each condition.
Table 1
Mean results in each cell of the design.
Hits (/12) False alarms (/12) d-prime C
Control
Bottom trials
Isolated 9.53 2.90 1.61 0.09
Aligned congruent 9.93 3.33 1.58 0.16
Aligned incongruent 8.53 4.07 1.02 0.09
Misaligned congruent 9.33 3.53 1.28 0.13
Misaligned incongruent 9.33 3.40 1.44 0.09
Top trials
Isolated 9.6 2.60 1.64 0.05
Aligned congruent 10.47 1.90 2.15 0.04
Aligned incongruent 8.6 3.00 1.28 0.05
Misaligned congruent 10.13 2.47 1.90 0.14
Misaligned incongruent 10.5 3.29 1.82 0.29
Autism
Bottom trials
Isolated 8.67 5.61 0.65 0.29
Aligned congruent 8.95 4.90 0.92 0.22
Aligned incongruent 7.09 6.33 0.16* 0.18
Misaligned congruent 9.23 4.95 0.99 0.28
Misaligned incongruent 7.95 6.19 0.40* 0.26
Top trials
Isolated 8.9 4.48 1.11 0.24
Aligned congruent 8.52 3.52 1.18 0.04
Aligned incongruent 7.57 4.29 0.78 0.02
Misaligned congruent 9 4.33 1.12 0.18
Misaligned incongruent 8.48 4.67 0.90 0.17
* Mean d-prime values not signiﬁcantly different from 0.
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In addition, we found a signiﬁcant Part x Group interaction,
F(1,34) = 5.09, p = .03. Post-hoc tests (Scheffé’s, alpha = .05) re-vealed that the two groups were not different on the bottom part,
but the ASD group was slower than the control group on top judg-
ments. However, this pattern is difﬁcult to interpret because par-
ticipants in the ASD group were mainly guessing on incongruent
bottom judgment trials. We conducted a different ANOVA with
Part and Alignment as within-subject factors and Group as a be-
tween-subject factor, but using only the congruent trials for which
performance was above ﬂoor in all conditions. The part  group
interaction was still observed, F(1,34) = 5.28, p = .03, suggesting a
relative disadvantage in speed for top judgments in the ASD group.
3.2. Isolated parts conditions
One use for isolated trials in this task is as a baseline to assess
whether congruency effects are due to facilitation from congruent
parts or to interference from incongruent parts. Here, none of the
whole face conditions was statistically different than the isolated
parts baseline, so the congruency effects are best conceived as a
combination of both type of inﬂuences. However, analyzing the
isolated trials on their own, comparing across groups, can also be
informative.
Although the analyses on whole face composite trials showed
no group difference in overall performance for top and bottom
parts in sensitivity (both groups performed better with tops), re-
sponse times revealed that individuals with ASDs were relatively
slower when matching top parts. It is unclear whether this is be-
cause they found the top parts more difﬁcult to discriminate or
whether they looked longer at them for some other reason. Fortu-
nately, because our design includes both whole face trials and iso-
lated parts, we can test whether there is a performance deﬁcit for
the top parts that are shown in isolation. That is, if individuals with
ASDs really have more difﬁculty discriminating tops, this should
also hold when the tops are shown in isolation and when the
two parts do not compete for attention. As can be appreciated in
Fig. 3 (focusing on the isolated baseline trials), controls performed
equally well on top and bottom trials t(14) = .15, p = .88. In con-
trast, adolescents with ASDs performed better on top than on bot-
tom trials, t(20) = 2.81, p = .01. However, a 2  2 ANOVA failed to
show a signiﬁcant interaction between group and Part, F(1,34) =
2.35, p = .13, but there clearly was a main effect of group
F(1,34) = 7.87, p = .008. Analyses on response times showed no sig-
niﬁcant differences between conditions.
Therefore, contrary to results when parts were presented to-
gether, when face parts were shown in isolation there was no indi-
cation of a part  group interaction in speed (F = .006). This result
allows us to reject the hypothesis that the ASD group has more dif-
ﬁculty discriminating the top half of our face stimuli relative to
control subjects. The deﬁcit in speed for top judgments when the
parts are presented together requires a different explanation. For
instance, given all parts of a face, participants in the ASD group
may choose to favor the mouth region.
The ﬁnding that participants with ASDs were better at matching
top than bottom halves of faces seem to conﬂict with prior reports
of an advantage for processing mouths over eyes (Joseph & Tanaka,
2003; Klin et al., 2002). However, other work suggests that a
mouth advantage is not always found. One study found the eyes
to be relatively more efﬁcient primes than other parts for individ-
uals with ASDs than for controls (Lahaie et al., 2006). In addition
and similar to our ﬁndings, Joseph and Tanaka (2003) found less
of a difference between performance on eyes and mouths in their
Autism group when these parts were recognized in isolation com-
pared to when they were recognized in the context of a whole face.
It may be important to distinguish situations in which partici-
pants are presented with several features competing for their
attention, which appears to increase attention to the mouth in
ASD (Joseph & Tanaka, 2003 whole face condition; Klin et al.,
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tions in which attention is directed to a speciﬁc feature or in which
isolated features are presented, and where there does not seem to
be a mouth advantage (this study, Lopez et al., 2004 cued condi-
tion, Joseph & Tanaka isolated part condition). The top advantage
in discrimination of isolated parts found here could be partially ex-
plained by the top halves being more diagnostic than the bottom
halves in our stimuli, something that could drive a group difference
if the ASD participants are struggling to ﬁnd diagnostic features. It
is also important to note that the entire face halves were used and
provided potentially diagnostic information, so it is impossible to
know whether participants focused on the eyes or mouth per se,
or if they used other areas such as the forehead and chin.
3.3. Correlations with IQ
We considered the possibility that the group differences we ob-
served could be due to IQ differences (despite the fact that the
groups were statistically matched in IQ, there is always the possi-
bility that a small difference, undetectable with our sample sizes,
may nonetheless have an important effect on performance). With-
in each group separately, we correlated FSIQ with the three perfor-
mance measures that represent the most important group
differences: the congruency effect in sensitivity with misaligned
faces (Cong-Mis), reaction times for top judgments on whole com-
posites (Top-Whole) and sensitivity for top judgments with iso-
lated parts (Top-Iso). In the ASD group, these correlations were
not signiﬁcant (Cong-Mis: p = .24; Top-Whole: p = .11; Top-Iso:
p = .94) and the same was true of the controls (Cong-Mis: p = .59;
Top-Whole: p = .26; Top-Iso: p = .24). Similarly, none of the corre-
lations with performance IQ or verbal IQ were signiﬁcant. There-
fore, we ﬁnd no evidence that IQ is responsible for these group
differences.
4. Discussion
In this study, even after matching the groups for age and IQ, we
found that individuals with ASDs were impaired at matching face
parts. We also replicated the result previously obtained in the par-
tial design version of the composite paradigm (Teunisse & de Gel-
der, 2003): while controls show the expected effect of alignment,
individuals with ASDs do not. These results were originally inter-
preted to show that individuals with ASDs process faces less holis-
tically than controls. However, because the prior study used the
partial composite design, it was impossible to know whether this
was due to their experiencing less interference in the aligned con-
dition (which was assumed) or more interference in the misaligned
condition. Our results using the complete composite paradigm re-
veal that when making a judgment about aligned face parts, ado-
lescents with ASDs, although worse overall, experienced as much
interference from the irrelevant parts as controls. Surprisingly,
the interaction between group and alignment arises from the fact
that, although misalignment reduces holistic processing in con-
trols, it does not reduce holistic processing in the ASD group.
What do these results suggest about the nature of face process-
ing difﬁculties in individuals with ASDs? For readers more familiar
with the literature on ASD than with that on holistic processing of
faces, it may be useful to note that psychologists are still debating
the nature and processing locus of holistic processing. For instance,
while most authors using this paradigm have assumed that the ef-
fect reﬂects perceptual mechanisms, recent work suggests that it
may have a more decisional source (Wenger & Ingvalson, 2002;
Richler, Gauthier et al., 2008; Richler, Tanaka et al., 2008). This is
not an uncommon situation: tasks that yield very robust effects
in the typical population are often used with atypical populations
in the hope that we can ‘‘understand the deﬁcit”, but a robust effectis not necessarily one that is fully understood. Therefore, it is ex-
pected that both literatures will beneﬁt from future developments
in the other ﬁeld, and for the moment, from tempering their inter-
pretations by acknowledging current limitations.
With such caveats inmind, an important question is whether the
normal congruency pattern for aligned faces obtained for children
withASDs canbe assumed to be supported by the samemechanisms
(whatever they may be) as in controls. Indeed, one straightforward
interpretation is that the aligned congruency effect in ASD partici-
pants reﬂects intact holistic processing of upright aligned faces. By
this account, children with ASDs might simply perform worse
because of a general impairment that may not be face speciﬁc
(Behrmann et al., 2006; Boucher & Lewis, 1992; Klin et al., 1999;
Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1990; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003)
but they would be using a normal strategy. This conclusion would
be consistent with the suggestion that global face processing is not
affected in ASD (Jemel, Mottron, & Dawson, 2006). However, recent
work offers strong evidence that the face processing deﬁcits in ASD
are not due to a general local processing bias, but reﬂect a cate-
gory-speciﬁc impairment (Wolf et al., in press).
There is however a different possible interpretation of our re-
sults, whereby similar congruency effects for aligned faces in the
ASD and control groups may be obtained for different reasons. By
this account, a congruency effect that is not modulated by align-
ment is qualitatively different and stems from abnormal face pro-
cessing mechanisms. This idea is supported by the results of a
recent study using the same composite task, but with composites
of artiﬁcial novel objects (Greebles) in control individuals who
had no prior experience with these objects (Richler et al., in press).
As might be expected, no holistic processing (no congruency effect)
was observed with non-face objects in novice observers, consistent
with the idea that the effect is face-speciﬁc. But surprisingly, a con-
gruency effect was obtained in one condition, when the study ob-
ject in each trial was shown in a misaligned conﬁguration. Similar
to the congruency effect we observed here in the ASD group, this
‘‘contextual” congruency effect was not diminished by misaligning
the parts of the test stimulus. It was proposed that having to en-
code both parts of a misaligned object may encourage an atten-
tional strategy that conﬂicts with selective attention. Moreover,
in a second experiment where only half of the trials showed a mis-
aligned object at study and the other trials used an aligned object
at study, a congruency effect was obtained on all trials (even in tri-
als where both objects compared were shown in an aligned conﬁg-
uration). What this suggests is that there are conditions where the
context of the experiment can lead novices to process objects
holistically. This contextual holistic processing is distinguished
from the more automatic holistic processing strategy observed
regardless of context with faces by the lack of sensitivity to conﬁg-
uration (i.e. equivalent congruency effects regardless of the align-
ment of parts at test).
It is possible that the pattern we observe for faces in ASD partic-
ipants is not unlike that seen when novice observers process ob-
jects. Indeed, in the present design, some of the faces were
studied in a misaligned conﬁguration. This was originally chosen
because for typically developing adults, this does not change the
result for faces – face experts may have developed automatic per-
ceptual routines that are less easily inﬂuenced by context. But if
individuals with ASDs process faces more like novices (Schultz,
2005), then we might expect them to show a contextual congru-
ency effect with faces, because of the presence of misaligned study
faces in the experiment. This conjecture could be tested in future
work in a modiﬁed experiment including only aligned faces at
study. This modiﬁed design should considerably reduce the face
congruency effect in individuals with ASDs, if indeed they can be
described as face novices, while it should have little inﬂuence in
controls.
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the current disconnect between general theories of perceptual pro-
cessing in ASDs and empirical results in face perception. For in-
stance, in a review of several empirical studies, Happe and Frith
(2006) discuss the weak coherence account of Autism according
to which several aspects of perception in Autism are explained
by a superiority in local (rather than global) processing. To address
the fact that some of the research on face perception in Autism re-
veals holistic effects, as exempliﬁed by the present work, these
authors suggest that it is because faces ‘‘may be so special in terms
of evolutionary signiﬁcance and developmental expertise that ﬁnd-
ings from face studies cannot be generalized to other stimulus clas-
ses” (p. 13, Happe & Frith, 2006). However, if the face holistic
ﬁndings in ASD were context driven rather than indexing expertise,
they could be reconciled with other results that reveal face deﬁcits
in ASD participants. The recent ﬁndings distinguishing expertise
driven and context driven holistic processing (Richler et al., in
press) suggests that normal holistic processing of faces should only
be claimed when there is a modulation of holistic effects by
conﬁguration.
To conclude, the present work is consistent with the suggestion
that individuals with ASDs may lack expertise with faces, which
could result both in abnormal holistic processing of faces and hypo-
activity of the fusiform face area (Schultz et al., 2000). A review of
face processing in Autism (Jemel et al., 2006) has misrepresented
the conclusions we have drawn from our prior work: It was stated
that because of recent evidence that a boywith Autismwhowas ex-
pert with the Digimon cartoon characters activated the fusiform
gyrus for these objects (Grelotti et al., 2005), we abandoned the
hypothesis that participants with ASDs may lack face expertise.
On the contrary, we believe that this result only strengthens the
notion that interest and experience (which is deﬁcient for face per-
ception in ASD participants) can specialize the fusiform gyrus for an
object category. This conclusion is not entirely incompatible with
the existence of more general conﬁgural deﬁcits in ASD (Behrmann
et al., 2006), which could be a factor in limiting their perceptual
expertise with faces in the ﬁrst place. Because perceptual expertise
appears to rely on hyperspeciﬁc representations (that do not gener-
alize across many transformations such as inversion or changes in
conﬁguration), a host of different anomalies affecting visual
processing could perturb its acquisition. These may include a local
processing bias, as has been reported in ASD participants. The ef-
fects of a general impairment could lead to more important deﬁcits
in the domain of face processing compared to most other domains
because the comparison is with typically developing individuals
who have acquired exquisite perceptual skills with faces.
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